Contract signing is a practical application of the fair exchange of digital signatures. This application used to be realized by directly adopting the results of the fair exchange of signatures, which do not completely meet the requirements of the signing of a secret contract. The assistance of a trusted third party (TTP) and some cryptographic technology are required to allow two parties to exchange their signatures through the network in a fair manner because these two parties potentially may be dishonest or mistrust each other. This paper presents a subtle method of preventing the off-line TTP from gaining the exchanged signature and the corresponding message when a dispute occurs between the two parties wherein the TTP is required to take part in the exchange procedure. An advanced concept, the non-disclosure property, is proposed in order to prevent a party from misusing evidence left during the exchange process. Two approaches, namely the secret divide method and the convertible signature are demonstrated. To satisfy the properties of the traditional paper-based contract signing, the technique of multi-signature scheme is used in the proposed protocols.
Introduction
Contract signing, which refers to an act whereby two or more parties agree to a common document incorporating plans, specifications and responsibilities, is necessary in business transactions. Traditionally, each party signs his name on his copy of the paper contract, exchanges his copy with the other party, and then signs on the other party's copy. In the end, each copy of the contract has the signatures of both parties. A critical problem involving fairness could arise during the exchange of signatures through the Internet. This has been widely discussed in recent literature which focuses on guaranteeing that both parties can obtain the signatures they desire, or none of the parties receive any information about the signatures at the end of exchange procedure.
The fair exchange of the signatures can be directly used to solve the problem of contract signing, but it is not an appealing solution. Many practical applications need more security considerations. A perennial problem is how to protect the privacy of the parties as they sign the contract. For example, if two companies want to make a secret contract describing the details of cooperation between them in order to achieve a business opportunity, they must protect this important plan from being disclosed to others. The existing efficient fair exchange protocol requires the involvement of a trusted third party (TTP) because the simultaneous secret exchange [4] , [11] , [19] is impractical especially when dealing with a large amount of information. It is possible that the TTP misuses the signature on the contract by leaking the information to someone who prosecutes commercial espionage or works with the mass media.
A straightforward TTP approach is to use an on-line TTP [9] , [13] , [22] . Such a TTP operates as a mediator for both parties during each transaction. Clearly, an on-line TTP is inefficient and can become a communication and computation bottleneck since the TTP is always involved in all the transactions even if the two parties have no malicious intent. The performance can be enhanced if the TTP acts as a troubleshooter that solves a dispute between the two parties. The TTP becomes involved in the protocol only when an error occurs or when one of the two parties behaves maliciously during the exchange procedure. Such an approach is called off-line TTP [1] , [2] , [6] , [7] , [15] , [23] . The first concept of protecting the parties' privacy was proposed by Franklin and Reiter in 1997 [13] . They presented a technique involving a semi-trusted third party (STTP) to avoid the TTP from obtaining unlimited exchanged data. This means that no one can be fully trusted and hence, TTP's access is restricted to obviate his ability to possibly misuse the exchanged data. However, the STTP proposed by Franklin and Reiter can be applied only in an on-line TTP environment which is inefficient when dealing with a large amount of exchange data. Moreover, it is unsuitable for the exchange of signatures.
A fair contract signing is required to provide an all or nothing property to ensure true fairness. A more precise definition for this property is included in the present paper. If two parties fail to complete the contract signing procedure, no "evidence" should be left in order to help one party in proving that the other party agreed to sign the contract (although they ended up without completing the agreement). This is called a non-disclosure protocol. Bao et al. [2] proposed a practical and efficient protocol which can be used for a fair exchange of signatures. They employed the concept of Certificate of Encrypted Message Being a Signature (CE MBS) to convince people that an encrypted message contains a party's signature without revealing the signature. This CE MBS proof can be established by an interactive zero-knowledge proof or a non-interactive proof [16] . If a non-interactive proof is used, clues are left behind and Copyright c 2006 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers thus, supplying a party with evidence that can be used to prove the presence of the other party's signature. Although the evidence is not a formal type of signature, it discloses significant information. Even if their protocol exploits an interactive zero-knowledge proof, it still is vulnerable to the middle-person attack [16] . The trap-door commitment technique [16] should be used to provide a non-interactive zeroknowledge proof. Related Works and Our Contributions. Most of the previous fair exchange protocols [1] , [2] , [7] , [15] can be used to develop the contract signing. However, they are called fair exchange of signature because two signatures exchanged by two parties cannot be combined into a single signature, as in traditional paper-based contract signing. Bao et al. [2] proposed several efficient and practical fair exchange protocols with the off-line TTP, using the cryptographic primitive CE MBS. Although they presented a protocol for the fair exchange of signatures on a common file, our observation revealed that their protocol provides only the exchange of two separate signatures instead of a single signature containing the identities of the two signing parties. In 2000, Asokan et al. [1] proposed an optimistic model that can be applied to exchange commonly used signatures such as RSA, DSS, GQ and Schnorr. Their model uses the verifiable escrow scheme which is more generic and efficient than the double-deckerdiscrete-logarithm-based verifiable encryption scheme proposed by Stadler [21] .
Franklin and Reiter [13] proposed the concept of the semi-trusted third party, which is required to follow the exchange protocol and cannot conspire with either one of the exchanging parties. Accordingly, any exchanged secret is hidden from the TTP. Their protocol does not allow TTP to gain any useful information about the exchanged secret to prevent its possible misuse. Franklin and Reiter's solution is inefficient, because it uses the on-line TTP model. The protocol proposed herein is more efficient because it uses a more efficient model called Off-line Semi-trusted Third Party which is extended to the exchange of digital signatures.
In 1999, Bao and Deng proposed an efficient fair exchange protocol with an off-line semi-trusted third party [3] . They use the CE MBS with blind decryption to prevent TTP from learning the exchanged messages. Their paper provides a good solution for an off-line STTP model; however, it does not consider all the requirements for nondisclosure. In other words, the authors do not include a situation wherein some damaging evidences may be left during the exchange process and which may be misused by the exchanging parties or the TTP.
Garay et al. [15] in 1999 proposed a new concept of abuse-free optimistic contract signing protocol which was similar to our partial results. There were many nice solutions and analyses in their protocol. Unfortunately, they failed to discuss the disclosure of the signature for the TTP and thus, the TTP was fully trusted. Moreover, in 1998 Chen [7] proposed an efficient fair exchange protocol, using the confirmation signature scheme. However, it did not offer the contract signing properties proposed in this work.
Some of the recent studies have focused on improving the efficiency of the verifiable encrypted message (VEM) or the verifiable encrypted signature (VES) (also called CE MBS). VEM (or VES) is a primitive building block in the off-line TTP fair exchange protocol, but is always timeconsuming because of the use of zero-knowledge protocol. Nenadic et al. [18] proposed a fair DSA-based signature exchange protocol that uses an efficient VES. Boneh et al. [5] proposed an efficient VES based on an aggregate signature as a further method for use in a pairing-based cryptosystem. However, these protocols do not meet all the requirements of the proposed non-disclosure property.
The present research provides two practical implementations namely, the secret divide method and the convertible signature, in order to achieve our goal. The former is extended from Franklin and Reiter [13] as well as from Bao and Deng [3] , while the latter involves the designated confirmer signature scheme as seen, for example, in [8] , [17] . In summary, our contributions include the following two areas:
1. The present paper introduces the concept of nondisclosure fair contract signing with the following two important properties. (a) If the contract signing protocol fails, none of the exchanging parties can obtain evidence which can be used to prove that the other party agreed to sign the contract. (b) The TTP cannot obtain any publicly verifiable information about the two exchanging parties signing the contract. 2. The present paper uses the technique of multi-signature scheme to make two exchanging parties obtain the same copy of the contract signature containing each one of their signatures. This result satisfies the properties of traditional paper-based contract signing.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic definitions used in our protocols are shown in Sect. 2. Section 3 offers a straightforward but defective protocol to explain why the non-disclosure property is required. Section 4 more precisely describes the security model for the non-disclosure fair contract signing protocol. Section 5 demonstrates the implementation of a nondisclosure contract signing protocol using the technique of secret divide. Section 6 demonstrates the implementation of a non-disclosure contract signing protocol using the technique of a convertible signature. Section 7 draws conclusions and offers ideas for future research.
Preliminary
Verifiable Encryption of Discrete Logarithms (VEDL), proposed by Stadler in 1996 [21] , is a successful method for validating a secret without releasing it. In 1998, Bao et al. used this method to construct a fair exchange protocol [2] . The VEDL is introduced below and an improved version, with the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, is presented, to ensure non-transferability and efficiency. VEDL is implemented as follows [21] . The ElGamal scheme [10] is used here for the implementation of the VEDL. Let p be a large prime and q be a prime factor of p−1 (i.e. q|p − 1). We also assume that q − 1 = 2q for prime q . There are two different generators for the groups G q and G q , where G q is a subgroup of order q of the cyclic group Z p * and G q is a subgroup of order q of the cyclic group Z q * . Assume that g ∈ Z p * is a generator of G q and α ∈ Z q * of order q is a generator of G q . Notably, q must have a large prime factor such that solving the discrete logarithm problem to the base α is infeasible. A message m ∈ Z q * is encrypted by choosing k ∈ Z q * and computing the ciphertext
The ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ) can be decrypted as follows;
2 mod q, where S K is a private key that corresponds to the public key
This equation demonstrates that if the prover proves that the discrete logarithm of C 1 to the base α equals the double discrete logarithm of f (m) C 2 to the base g and PK, then he can prove that C is the encryption of the message m. Such a proof is called Proof of Equivalence of Discrete Logarithm to Discrete LogLogarithm (PEDLDLL) and can be implemented either the interactive or the noninteractive protocol found in [2] , [21] . However, the noninteractive protocol, although more efficient, cannot be a zero-knowledge proof since the verifier can transfer the proof by showing the evidence to others. Thus, we used the trapdoor commitment technique [16] to design a PEDLDLL with the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. The implementation of the PEDLDLL with the noninteractive zero-knowledge proof is discussed as follows.
Let (S K V , PK V ), where PK V = α S K V mod q, be a pair of the verifier's secret/public keys for encryption. The prover randomly chooses u, v ∈ Z q * and constructs a trapdoor commitment δ = α u PK V v (mod q). Let u be represented as a bit-stream (u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u ), where is the bitlength of u (recommended to be between 140 to 160). The prover randomly chooses θ i ∈ Z q * , for i = 1, 2, · · · , and
where e i denotes the i-th bit of
Here, H is assumed to be a collision resistant one-way hash function {0, 1} * → {0, 1} . Hence, the proof consists of R, e, u and v. The verifier can compute t αi = α r i w
, and check whether the following equation holds.
Forgeable Simulating Transcript. The prover can use this proof to convince the verifier U V . However, the verifier U V , having received the proof evidence cannot use it to convince others because U V , while knowing the secret S K V , can easily construct the following forged transcript to cheat others. The verifier U V randomly chooses ϕ ∈ Z q * (represented as a bit-stream (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , · · · , ϕ )) andr i ∈ Z q * , and then
(mod p). The verifier U V randomly chooses π ∈ Z q * ; computesδ = α π (mod q), and then he computes e = H (δ||w||α||h||W||g||t α1 ||t g1 || · · · ||t α ||t g ), wherew andW are forged messages arbitrarily selected by U V . Consequently, V can easily computeū i , for i = 1, 2, · · · , andv using the following two equations.
Definition 2.3:
(Verifiable Encryption of Discrete Logarithms with a Designated Verifier, VEDLDV) Let U P be a prover and U V be a designated verifier. U P can prove to U V that the cipher C is the encryption of the message m without revealing m. U P presents the proof of Proof VEDLDV (U V , C, PK, f (m)) to U V , where PK denotes the encryption public key and f () denotes a certified oneway function. The designated verifier U V , however, cannot transfer the verifiable evidence to convince others that the proof is correct.
The prover constructs an encryption according to Definition 2.1 to implement this proof. Then, he proves this encryption using PEDLDLL with a non-interactive zeroknowledge proof, as described in Definition 2.2.
A Straightforward but Defective Protocol
This section presents a straightforward but defective protocol, to indicate that an incorrect design will result in a leakage of evidence, which can be misused by some interested party. The size of the signature is also halved using the Schnorr's multi-signature scheme [20] , which can make the protocol similar to that of traditional paper-based contract signing. A high-level view of this protocol is presented below. A simplified secret divide method for an off-line TTP is described. A dispute may occur in Step 4 if U A refuses to reveal his signature. In this case, U B may ask T T P to resolve this dispute.
5. U B encrypts his signature using U A 's public key. Then U B sends this cipher, together with the corresponding proof and U A 's cipher (received in
Step 2), to T T P for dispute resolution. 6. T T P verifies the messages sent from U B . If the verification succeeds, then T T P sends U B 's encrypted signature to U A and decrypts U A 's cipher for U B .
Before the details of the protocol are described, a oneway function with an additional multiplicative property is defined, as follows.
Definition 3.1: One-way Function with an Additional
Multiplicative Property [13] . A one-way function f :
Thus, f has an additional multiplicative property that is associated with a computable function F :
Assume that the users U A , U B and T T P have two types of private key and public key pairs -(x U , y U = g x U mod p) for signing and (S K U , PK U = α S K U mod q) for encryption, where U ∈ {A, B, T T P}. The detailed procedure of the protocol is described below. (Notably, H and h are two collision resistant oneway hash functions.) Then, U A randomly chooses a 1 ∈ Z * q and computes a 2 = z A a 
) is also checked. If these are all verified, T T P sends E PK A (z B ) to U A and a 1 to U B to force the exchange procedure to completion.
Analysis. At the end of the protocol, U A receives (c, z B ) from U B and U B receives (c, z A ) from U A if they are both honest. Therefore, a complete signature (c, z = z A + z B (mod p)) on the contract m can be individually computed by U A and U B if they add up their own signatures and the signatures from the other parties. Clearly, this protocol can hide the exchanged signature by dividing z A into two parts. One is known only to U A and U B , and the other is delivered to T T P. In the Dispute procedure, T T P only obtains a 1 and E PK TT P (z B ) from U B , so that T T P knows nothing about the signature on the contract. However, this protocol is defective because U A incidentally leaves behind the "evidence" S ig x A (E PK TT P (a 1 )||c|| f (z A )), which can be used to prove that he agreed to sign the contract. This situation is unfair since U B may not leave such evidence if he terminates the protocol at the end of Step 2.
We address here that S ig x A (E PK TT P (a 1 )||c|| f (z A )) is required in this protocol for some security reasons. Clearly, in
Step 5 of the Dispute phase, U B can compute a different c = H(R A , R B , h(m)) where R B is fake (meaning that R B is not the same as the one previously negotiated with U A ). Therefore, U B randomly selects r B and computes
. In this case, T T P will be convinced that all messages delivered from U B are correct. Consequently, such a situation is unfair because U B can obtain a correct signature on m from U A , but U A cannot obtain a correct one from U B .
The next section describes a more precise description of the security model for the non-disclosure fair contract signing protocol.
Security Model for the Non-disclosure Fair Contract Signing Protocol
We present the security model by formally defining fairness and non-disclosure. Asokan et al. [1] proposed a useful security definition for fairness. We extend their definition to make it suitable for our protocol. Three honest parties U A , U B and T T P are defined as follows. An honest party is a polynomial-time interactive Turing machine that follows the predefined protocol. T T P can be regarded as a server that continually receives a request, updates the current state and outputs a response. U A and U B may interact with each other or with T T P before outputting the result.
An honest party U i (i = A or B) in the initial state has the inputs: PK T T P , PK i , PK¯i, y i , y¯i, m, σ i . Notably, if i = A thenī = B, and vice versa. The public keys PK i and y i are the encryption public key and the signing public key, respectively. Here, σ i is U i 's signature on message m. When terminating his program, U i privately outputs σ¯i, which is U¯i's signature on the message m.
Game A: Fairness
The fairness of the contract signing protocol is defined by the following game procedure. This game involves three parties -an adversary U B * and two honest parties U A and T T P. A particular signature scheme Λ and a corresponding signing oracle S are also defined. The game proceeds as follows. Notably, the names of U B * and U A are arbitrary. The names can be changed to U A * and U B in this game.
U B * can arbitrarily access T T P and the signing oracle
S to obtain the signatures on adaptively chosen messages. 2. U B * selects a message m, which must differ from those sent to S in Step 1. The contract signing protocol is fair when the probability that U B * wins the game is negligible.
Definition 4.1:
An adversary U B * has advantage ε(k) in breaking fairness of the contract signing protocol P if for a sufficiently large security parameter k,
We say that P is fair if Adv The party U i is assumed eventually to output a signature σ¯i and REC i , namely a set of all messages received from U¯i and T T P. This game is similar to Game A except in the final step. Remark. The publicly verifiable information about a party U i signing the message m can be regarded as an evidence which can be used to prove to a third party that U i is actually inclined to sign m. For example, in Protocol 1, S ig x A (E PK TT P (a 1 )||c|| f (z A )) can be a kind of publicly verifiable information of U A signing the message m.
Definition 4.2:
An adversary U B * has advantage ε(k) in breaking the non-disclosure property for the exchanging parties of the contract signing protocol P if for a sufficiently large security parameter k,
. We say that P satisfies the non-disclosure property for the exchanging parties if Adv Non-disclosure for the trusted third party is formally defined below. Assume U A + and U B + are two parties (either honest or dishonest) who interact with T T P by faithfully following the predefined protocol. After U A + and U B + have terminated and output their results, T T P cannot learn about σ A + and σ B + , and cannot also obtain any publicly verifiable information of U A + and U B + signing the message m.
A simple game is designed in which an adversary T T P * can arbitrarily interact with U A + and U B + but must honestly reply to their requests. U A + and U B + are assumed to be able arbitrarily to interact with each other but to be able to send T T P * only valid messages allowed by the protocol. Eventually, U A + and U B + terminate and output the results. T T P * is said to win the game if he can output σ A + or σ B + , or obtain publicly verifiable information of U A + or U B + signing the message m.
Definition 4.3: An adversary T T P
* has advantage ε(k) in breaking the non-disclosure property for the TTP of the contract signing protocol P if for a sufficiently large security parameter k,
We say that P satisfies the non-disclosure property for the TTP if Adv ND P,T T P * (k) is a negligible function.
A Non-disclosure Fair Contract Signing Protocol Implemented by the Secret Divide Technique

Main Protocol
This section demonstrates a modification of Protocol 1 in the preceding section to achieve the non-disclosure property described in Session 4. The main task is to eliminate U A 's evidence without suffering forgery or replay attack. Furthermore, we focus on the VEDL proof. If the VEDL is executed with an interactive proof, it can be regarded as "proof in the dark" and non-transferability. However, Jakobsson et al. [16] noted some drawbacks for the generic interactive proof. For efficiency and security, we suggest the use of a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (see Definition 2.2 and Definition 2.3).
A new Protocol 2 is described below by only indicating the steps that differ from those of Protocol 1. (mod q). Subsequently, U A sends E PK TT P (a 1 ), f (a 1 ), f (z A ), a 2 , f (a 2 ) and Proof VEDLDV (U B , E PK TT P (a 1 ), PK T T P , f (a 1 )) to U B . 
Verification and signature exchange for U B . U B computes c = H(R A · R B , h(m)) and checks whether
is also checked. If the above verifications pass, T T P sends E PK A (z B ) to U A and a 1 to U B to force the exchange procedure to completion.
Security Analysis
The security conditions of the above-mentioned protocol are examined. Following the security model described in Sect. 4, we discuss the fairness property in Theorem 5.1, the non-disclosure for the exchanging parties in Lemma 5.1, and the non-disclosure for the TTP in Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3. That at the end of Step 4, both U A and U B can obtain the valid signature (c, z) on the contract m can be straightforwardly demonstrated. Condition 2: U A is dishonest.
The fairness of Protocol 2 in this situation is proven by contradiction. Assuming that an adversary U A * plays Game A with the honest U B , and U A * wins the game with a nonnegligible probability, we show that U A * can break some secure primitives. The game is now truncated at several points shown below.
If the game stops when U A * has sent valid messages in Step 2 , U A * will certainly lose the game if it continues, because U B can obtains z A by asking T T P to decipher E PK TT P (a 1 ). If the game further stops just before U B sends z B to U A * in Step 3 , then the only possible scenario in which U A * can still win the game at this point is for U A * to forge the transmitted messages in Step 2 . The security of Proof VEDLDV (U B , E PK TT P (a 1 ), PK TT P , f (a 1 )) can be shown to be as hard to solve as the DDH in [21] .
Hence, assume that U A * can produce a forged z A that passes the verification equations,
. To do that, U A * must forge a Schnorr signature, which was proven to be secure in the random oracle model if solving the Discrete Logarithm problem (DLP) is hard [12] . That means that U A * can forge a Schnorr signature if he has the ability to solve the DLP, and hence, has also the ability to solve the DDH. Therefore, U A * wins the game at this point that contradicts the security of the DDH assumption.
Finally, assuming that the game stops before U A * sends (c, z A ) to U B in Step 4, U A * definitely loses the game if it continues. Since U A * has sent U B a valid E PK TT P (a 1 ) in Step 2 , U B can obtain a 1 through the Dispute procedure. Condition 3: U B is dishonest.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that an adversary U B * plays Game A with the honest U A , and U B * wins the game with a non-negligible probability. The game is also truncated at several points, as follows.
If the game stops before U B * sends z B to U A in Step 3 , we can show that U B * cannot win the game unless he can solve the DDH. First, assume that U B * does not perform the Dispute procedure to ask T T P to decrypt E PK TT P (a 1 ). In this situation, U B * can still win the game only if he can extract z A from the messages sent by U A in Step 2 . U B * can carry out the above attack in the following scenarios; (1) U B * extracts a 1 from E PK TT P (a 1 ); U B * must break ElGamal encryption, which is as hard as solving the DLP; (2) U B * extracts a 1 from f (a 1 ), which is as hard as solving the DLP; (3) U B * extracts z A from f (z A ), which is as hard as solving the DLP; (4) U B * extracts a 1 from E PK TT P (a 1 ), f (a 1 ) and Proof VEDLDV (U B , E PK TT P (a 1 ), PK TT P , f (a 1 )), which is as hard as solving the DDH.
In the second case, U B * asks T T P to resolve the dispute. If U B * sends a valid E PK A (z B ) to T T P, he surely loses the game, since U A will receive z B from T T P. If U B * sends an erroneous E PK A (z B ) and f (z B ) to T T P, we can show that U B * cannot obtain a 1 unless he can solve the DLP. The following scenario shows U B * 's possible behaviors. U B * randomly selects R A , R B and m and computes
) unless he can solve the DLP. Further, U B * is also infeasible to compute a valid f (a 2 ) (or a 2 ) that satisfies the equation F(a 1 , f (a 2 )) = ρ z A because he does not know anything about a 1 , and computing a 2 from f (a 1 ) a 2 (mod p) is as hard as breaking the DLP.
Finally, if the game stops when U B * has sent z B to U A in Step 4, then U B * will surely lose the game because U A will not send z A to U B * unless he has already received a valid z B .
Lemma 5.1: (Non-disclosure for the Exchanging Parties) In Protocol 2, based on the assumption that the DDH is hard to solve, one of the exchanging parties U i cannot obtain evidence which can be used to prove that the other party U¯i agreed to sign the contract, unless U¯i can also obtain such evidence of U i 's signing or can receive U i 's signature on the contract.
Proof. This lemma is proven according to the following two subjects.
(1) Non-disclosure for U A :
Consider an adversary U B * playing Game B with the honest U A . Assume, by way of contradiction, that U B * wins the game with a non-negligible probability.
If the game stops before U B * sends z B to U A in Step 3 , then according to Theorem 5.1, U B * cannot obtain z A under the assumption that DDH is hard. We can now show that U B * cannot obtain other evidence which can be used to prove that U A agreed to sign the contract. First, assume that U B * does not perform the Dispute procedure. We can show that U B * can simulate the messages sent by U A in Step 2 without knowing z A . That means that U B * cannot convince a third party that U A agreed to sign the contract because U B * has the ability to forge a transcript of U A 's transmitted messages. (mod p) to produced a forged f (a 1 ). According to Step 2 , U B * must also present E PK TT P (a 1 ) and Proof VEDLDV (U B , E PK TT P (a 1 ), PK T T P , f (a 1 )). In the above simulated transcripts, U B * cannot compute a 1 from ρ a 1 because f is a one-way function with an infeasible inverse. However, U B * can easily forge the proof Proof VEDLDV (·) even though he does not obtain the correct a 1 , because Proof VEDLDV (·) is a designated verifier zero-knowledge proof and U B * knows his own secret key. (See Definition 2.3.)
If U B * performs the Dispute procedure to ask T T P to decrypt E PK TT P (a 1 ), by Theorem 5.1, U B * will surely lose the game. Similarly, if the game stops when U B * has sent z B to U A in Step 4, then U B * will also certainly lose the game. (2) Non-disclosure for U B :
Consider an adversary U A * playing Game B with the honest U B . In Protocol 2, U B sends only z B to U A * either directly or through T T P. Thus, this non-disclosure property can be proven by applying Theorem 5.1.
Lemma 5.2:
(Non-disclosure for T T P: Part 1) In Protocol 2, based on the assumption that the DDH is hard to solve, T T P cannot obtain U A 's and U B 's signatures or their multisignature on the contract if he does not collude with either of U A and U B .
Proof. Consider an adversary T T P
* playing Game C with U A and U B . In the Normal phase, since T T P * does not get involved in the protocol, he gets nothing about the signatures on the contract. In the Dispute phase, T T P * receives E PK TT P (a 1 ), E PK A (z B ), f (z A ), f (z B ), f (a 2 ), c, h(m) and
can obtain a 1 ; however, assuming that T T P * attempts to extract z A or z B from the above messages, he can perform the following attacks; (1)extracts z A from f (z A ), extracts z B from f (z B ) or extracts a 2 from f (a 2 ); which is as hard as solving the DLP; (2)extracts z B from E PK A (z B ), f (z B ) and Proof VEDLDV (T T P, E PK A (z B ), PK A , f (z B )) , which is as hard as solving the DDH. Lemma 5.3: (Non-disclosure for T T P: Part 2) In Protocol 2, based on the assumption that the DDH is hard to solve, T T P cannot obtain evidence which can be used to prove that U A or U B signed (or agreed to sign) the contract if he does not collude with either of U A and U B .
* playing Game C with U A and U B . According to Lemma 5.2, T T P * cannot obtain z A and z B under the assumption that DDH is hard to solve. We can now show that T T P * cannot obtain other evidence which can be used to prove that U A or U B signed (or agreed to sign) the contract. Similar to Lemma 5.1, we can show here that T T P * can simulate the messages sent from U B in Step 5 without knowing z A and z B . T T P * randomly selects R A , R B and m, and computes (mod p) to produce a forged f (a 2 ). According to Step 5 , T T P * also needs to present E PK A (z B ) and Proof VEDLDV (T T P, E PK A (z B ), PK A , f (z B )). In the above simulated transcripts, T T P * cannot compute z B from ρ z B because f is a one-way function with an infeasible inverse. However, T T P * can easily forge the proof Proof VEDLDV (·) even though he does not know the correct z B , because Proof VEDLDV (·) is a designated verifier zeroknowledge proof and T T P * knows his own secret key. (See Definition 2.3.)
Theorem 5.2:
Under the assumption that the DDH is hard to solve, Protocol 2 is a non-disclosure fair contract signing protocol.
Proof. This theorem can be proven by Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3.
A Non-disclosure Fair Contract Signing Protocol
Implemented by the Convertible Signature
Main Protocol
The core technique addressed in this section is the convertible signature. A systematic scheme of convertible signatures is called designated confirmer signature scheme, which was first proposed by Chaum [8] in 1994 and improved further by Michels and Stadler [17] in 1998. The following definitions show the basic concept and implementation of the designated confirmer signature scheme.
Definition 6.1:
A signature S (m) on message m is called Designated Confirmer Signature if it satisfies the following requirements:
1. The signature S (m) can be verified by only cooperating with the signer or a designated confirmer. 2. The signer can convince the receiver that the signature is in fact valid and a designated confirmer will always be available to prove the validity of the signature. However, the receiver cannot obtain a transferable proof, meaning that the receiver cannot prove to a third party that the signature is valid and was really made by the signer.
Definition 6.2:
(The Implementation of Confirmer Commitments) [17] Let p and q be two large primes and q|p − 1. Let G q be a subgroup of Z * p of order q and h q : {0, 1} → Z q be a collision resistant hash function. A secure confirmer commitment can be constructed according to the following three phases.
Example of Schnorr-like Confirmer Signature [17].
Michels and Stadler [17] gave an example of a Schnorr-like confirmer signature with a non-adaptive adversary model, which can be used in our protocol. It is briefly described as follows. Let p and q be defined as previously stated. The signer's private key/public key pair is (x S , y S = g x S mod p). The signature is represented by (z, d) where d = Com(m||g r , g, y C ) and z = r − H(d)x S mod q, for r ∈ R Z q (Notably, H is a collision resistant one-way hash function.) For verifying this signature, one can ask the confirmer to prove that d is a commitment for (m||g z y S H(d) ). A Schnorr-like contract signing protocol based on the confirmer commitment is presented. Clearly, many other multi-signature schemes, such as the Elgamal-like [10] schemes, can be used in this kind of architecture.
Two signature notations should be carefully defined. S A (m) (or S B (m)) denotes U A 's (or U B 's) designated confirmer signature on the contract m. The complete designated confirmer signature on the contract, which includes the signatures of the two parties, is denoted by S (m). Notably, S (m) should be converted to a self-authenticated signature S ig(m) to be a useful signature which can be verified by everyone.
The signature construction is described as follows. + r B ) − H(d)(x A + x B ) ) mod q.
In the Normal phase of the proposed protocol, two parties should participate in the protocol to sign the contract. If a dispute occurs during the signature exchange, then T T P will take part in the protocol to convert the designated confirmer signature into a self-authenticated signature. The two phases (Normal Phase and Dispute Phase) are described below. If the verification passes, T T P sends the convertible decommitting key
H(d) ), g, y TT P )) (see Sect. 6.2, Algorithm 3) to U A and U B , and sends E PK B (z) to U B .
Eventually, both U A and U B can obtain
The Implementation Details
The following three algorithms are described as follows:
can be constructed by an interactive bi-proof shown in [14] , [17] . However, for the sake of efficiency and security, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is required. A simplified technique for proving the equality of two discrete logarithms is presented in [8] . Here, we describe its non-interactive zero-knowledge version. The prover U B , who knows the random t com , wants to show
(mod p). U B randomly chooses µ, ν, κ ∈ Z q * and calculates δ = g µ y ν A (mod p), e = H(δ||g||d 1 ||y T T P ||d 2 ||g κ ||y T T P κ ) and s = κ−(e+µ)t com mod q. The proof is a four-tuple (µ, ν, e, s). 
This algorithm can be constructed using a non-interactive bi-proof shown in [17] . Algorithm 1 can easily be modified to achieve the goal. Since it does not need to designate the verifier, the trapdoor commitment δ is omitted and µ is set to zero. Therefore, in this algorithm, T T P can show log g (y ) . T T P randomly chooses κ ∈ Z q * and calculates e = H(g||y TT P ||d 1 ||d 2 ||g κ ||d 1 κ ) and s = κ − ex TT P mod q. The proof is a two-tuple (e, s). To verify this proof, checking of e ? = H(g||y TT P ||d 1 ||d 2 ||g s y T T P e ||d 1 s d 2 e ) is used.
Security Analysis and Discussion
We can examine Protocol 3 with two important properties: fairness and non-disclosure. The security analysis is provided by the following theorems and lemmas. We can use Lemma 6.1 to prove that T T P has the ability to convert a confirmation signature to a self-authenticated signature, which can be applied to the proof of fairness. Moreover, we can discuss the fairness property in Theorem 6.1, the nondisclosure for the exchanging parties in Lemma 6.2, and the non-disclosure for the TTP in Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 6.4. Proof. This lemma can easily be proven by VEDL proof and the confirmation commitment. If U A delivers the correct h(m), d and f (z), T T P can compute a valid convertible decommitting key, since This situation can be proven by contradiction. Assuming that an adversary U A * plays Game A with the honest U B , and U A * wins the game with a non-negligible probability, we can show that U A * will break some secure primitives. As before, The game is truncated at several points.
If the game stops before U A * sends S (m) to U B in Step 3, we can show that U A * cannot win the game unless he can solve the DDH. First, assume that U A * does not perform the Dispute procedure. In this case, U A * can still win the game only if he can extract U B 's signature from S B (m). However, S B (m) is a Schnorr-like designated confirmer signature. It was proven in [17] that converting S B (m) to a self-authenticated signature is as hard as solving DDH.
In the second case, U A * asks T T P to solve the dispute. If U A * sends a valid E PK B (z) to T T P in Step 5, he will surely lose the game, because U B will receive z from T T P. If U A * sends erroneous messages to T T P in Step 5, we can show that the messages cannot passes the verification of T T P unless U A * can solve the DDH. The possible scenario is shown below. U A * randomly selects z and sends h(m),d, E PK B ( z), f (z) and Proof VEDLDV (T T P, E PK B ( z), PK B , f (z)) to T T P. This contradicts the security of the VEDL proof, and hence contradicts the DDH assumption.
Finally, if the game stops when U A * has sent S (m) to U B in Step 3, then U A * surely loses the game because U B does not send CDK B (d) to U A * unless he has already received a valid S (m). Condition 3: U B is dishonest.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that an adversary U B * plays Game A with the honest U A , and U B * wins the game with a non-negligible probability. The game is truncated at several points as shown below.
If the game stops when U B * has sent valid messages in Step 2, U B * will certainly lose the game because U A can construct S (m) from S B (m) and can ask T T P to convert S (m) to a self-authenticated signature. By Lemma 6.1, T T P can always do that if U A sends a valid S (m) to him. If the game further stops just before U A sends S (m) to U B * in Step 3, the only possible scenario in which U B * can still win the game is for U B * to forge the transmitted messages in Step 2. However, forging S B (m) that can pass the verification of DVP B (A, d) as described in Algorithm 1 is as hard as solving the DDH, which was already proven in [17] .
Finally, assuming that the game stops before U B * sends CDK B (d) to U A in Step 4, U B * will surely lose the game if it continues. Since U B * has sent U A a valid S B (m), U A can always ask T T P to reveal the decommitting key. Lemma 6.2: (Non-disclosure for the Exchanging Parties) In Protocol 3, based on the assumption that the DDH is hard to solve, one of the exchanging parties U i cannot obtain evidence that can be used to prove that the other party U¯i agreed to sign the contract, unless U¯i also obtains such evidence to show U i 's signing or receives U i 's signature on the contract.
Consider an adversary U B * playing Game B with the honest U A . In protocol 3, U A sends only S (m) to U B * either directly or through T T P. Therefore, this non-disclosure property can be proven by applying Theorem 6.1. (2) Non-disclosure for U B :
Consider an adversary U A * playing Game B with the honest U B . Assume, by way of contradiction, that U A * wins the game with a non-negligible probability.
If the game stops before U A * sends S (m) to U B in Step 3, according to Theorem 6.1, U A * cannot obtain U B 's signature on the contract under the assumption that the DDH is hard. We can now show that U A * cannot obtain other evidence that can be used to prove that U B agreed to sign the contract. Assuming that U A * does not perform the Dispute procedure, by Algorithm 1 in Sect. 6.2, U A * can forge a simulated transcript. In other words, DVP B (A, d) is a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof, and U A * cannot transfer the proof to others.
In another case, U A * performs the Dispute procedure.
By Theorem 6.1, U A * will surely lose the game. The same result of U A * losing the game can certainly be derived if the game stops when U A * has sent S (m) to U B .
Lemma 6.3: (Non-disclosure for T T P: Part 1) In Protocol 3, based on the assumption that the DDH is hard to solve, T T P cannot obtain U A 's and U B 's signatures or their multisignature on the contract if he does not collude with either of U A and U B .
In this case, the signature converted by T T P in the Dispute phase differs from the signature produced by the exchanging party in the Normal phase, because the conversions made by the original signer and by T T P are distinguishable. Therefore, whether T T P is involved in the contract signing can directly be discovered from the format of the signature. This problem does not arise in Protocol 2.
Conclusions
This work proposed two implementations of the nondisclosure fair contract signing. This protocol can be applied to make a secret contract and prevent the TTP from misusing the signature. Two directions for future research are discussed before conclusions are drawn. First, replacing the VEDL proof with another technique will make the implementation more generic. The VEDL depends on the double-decker of the discrete logarithm that causes the keys and the variables to have different ranges. Therefore, the VEDL is greatly restricted in the protocol design and type of signature scheme that can be used. Moreover, the proof of VEDL is relatively inefficient. Although this work proposed a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to improve the efficiency, the proof requires many parameters. Asokan et al. [1] proposed an escrow scheme for fair exchange. Knowing how to modify our protocols in order to make them capable of using the escrow scheme would be very interesting.
Second, the extension to a multi-party contract signing protocol can also be considered for future research. Furthermore, we would like to design such a protocol which would be secure against two or more exchanging parties who might collude in order to obtain some advantages.
